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The Eurasian Economic Union is a plurilateral Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) and Customs Union (CU) between 
Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. 
The organisation is modelled on the EU’s approach to 
trade integration and is the fruit of several prior 
integration attempts among post-Soviet Eurasian 
countries. Nonetheless, the EAEU’s organisational 
structure is more pyramidal, with several hierarchical 
intergovernmental bodies, compared to the more diffuse 
and technocratic decision-making mechanisms of the EU. 
While the EAEU’s high ambitions have not been met in its 
first one and a half years of existence, the organisation 
delivers in terms of policies, but suffers from an 
implementation deficit. 
 
The politics of the EAEU’s creation and operation oscillate 
between geopolitics and trade – between realist power 
calculations and subtler economic interests. Russia has 
espoused Eurasian integration as a way of realising its 
geopolitical ambitions, whereas other EAEU members, 
above all Kazakhstan, insist on the EAEU’s official 
purpose of boosting trade between the signatories. The 
EAEU is therefore a site of contestation between 
geopolitical and economic regionalism. It might deliver 
direly needed economic modernisation to its members, 
including Russia, but also engrains Russian hegemony in 
the region. 
 
Carrots from Minsk: The EU’s conditionality towards 
the EAEU  
 
Ukraine’s pro-Western protests in 2014 and the West’s 
mediation in Kyiv were answered with the annexation of 
Crimea and Russia’s arguable support to belligerents in 
Donbass. Russia had also attempted to incentivise Ukraine 
to join the EAEU. It should not be forgotten that prior to 
the geopolitical clash, Ukraine’s deliberate policy was to 
avoid a choice between East and West in terms of trade. 
 
Even after having signed a Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the EU in the framework of 
the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and refusing EAEU 
membership, Ukraine continued to have significant 
economic ties with Russia. To address this ambiguity, a 
trilateral dialogue was set up between the European 
Commission, Russia and Ukraine, and the implementation 
of the DCFTA was delayed until January 2016 to “avoid 
further destabilisation of the country and in particular to 
guarantee Ukraine’s access to the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) market under the Ukraine-Russia 
bilateral preferential regime” (European Commission 
2015a).  
 
 
Executive Summary 
> The establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union 
(EAEU) in January 2015 congealed EU-Russia 
relations in terms of geopolitics and trade policy. 
> To date, the EU has not formally recognised the 
EAEU. This recognition is conditioned on Russia 
implementing the Minsk agreements regarding the 
war in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. 
> Out of three potential scenarios, relations 
between the EU and the EAEU might eventually be 
established through trade talks. European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries should be 
part and parcel of this policy. 
> With Ukrainian membership ruled out, the EAEU 
today looks to countries and regions instead of the 
EU. The EU’s conditionality risks losing its grip. 
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The EU has made the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine, 
as stipulated in the Minsk agreements, the precondition 
for entering official relations with the EAEU (Malmström 
2016). This conditionality hence would require the 
disarmament of belligerents on both sides in Eastern 
Ukraine, self-government in Donbass and a constitutional 
reform in Ukraine. While not formally part of the Minsk 
agreements, Crimea’s status would have to be settled as 
well. The EU’s key condition for establishing formal 
relations with the EAEU is thus the implementation of the 
Minsk agreements. 
 
Short of an official recognition, there have been numerous 
technical and expert-level contacts with the EAEU. Such 
working-level dialogues have already been conducted with 
the trilateral CU (Haukkala 2010: 172). An ironic sign for 
the EAEU’s vivacity is half a dozen of WTO cases that the 
EU is preparing or has already lodged against unjustified 
protectionist measures taken by the EAEU. The European 
Commission is keeping these contacts at a low frequency, 
and EU Member States are driving the EU’s policy of 
insisting on conditionality.  
 
For the EU, potential relations with the EAEU are a positive 
incentive for resolving the conflict in Ukraine, while Russia 
sees relations as a means for economic rapprochement 
and possibly as a way to resolve EU-Russian competition in 
the Eastern Neighbourhood. Moscow blames Ukraine for 
the stalled implementation of the Minsk agreements, 
given Kyiv’s arguable unwillingness to honour the 
agreement. The EAEU Commission has sent a very short 
“draft agreement on economic cooperation” to the 
European Commission in 2015 and hence wishes to 
establish EU-EAEU ties without any preconditions. 
 
Three scenarios for EU-EAEU interregionalism 
 
Whether the EU develops a formalised relationship with 
the EAEU is part of broader policy considerations on the 
EU’s side, but also a matter of EU-Russian diplomacy. One 
can distinguish three stylized scenarios for potential EU-
EAEU interregionalism: first, a recalcitrant status quo with 
an unreformed ENP and no formal interregionalism, and 
possibly even more coercive foreign policies by Russia; 
second, a fairly realistic, gradual rapprochement, should 
the EAEU deliver on its plans; third, the distant possibility 
of EU-EAEU pan-continental free trade.  
 
First, the status quo could endure. An entrenched EU-
Russia relationship with increased importance given to 
security considerations means that the leeway for de-
escalation is limited. With Ukraine in the focus of the EU 
and Russia, Crimea might eventually even attain a similar 
strategic importance as other secessionist regions within 
ENP/’near abroad’ countries that receive military and 
political support from Moscow. There would presumably 
be no majority among EU member states for formalized 
relations with the EAEU, should this situation endure. The 
governing logic at play in this scenario is geopolitics.  
 
Second, the most probable scenario is that of a gradual 
rapprochement based on certain conditions set by the EU. 
In this scenario, the EAEU would need to deliver on its high 
ambitions and establish a well-functioning, integrated 
economic space. Re-engagement in this scenario is driven 
by a shared premise of the EU and Russia that there is a 
mutual interest in re-establishing a more stable 
relationship. The EU Ambassador to Russia argued in 
January 2016 that “we need to try to gradually repair our 
relations and establish a new modus operandi recognising 
our differences but seeking to work on common interests. 
Not a return to ‘business as usual’, but the creation of a 
‘new normal’ (Ušackas 2016). The EaP’s focus on trade 
would considerably inform the methodology of EU-EAEU 
relations in this form of interregionalism. Dialogue would 
focus on trade facilitation, technical barriers to trade or 
behind-the-border regulatory standards.  
 
Third, the most ambitious proposals for EU-EAEU 
interregionalism concern the famous FTA ‘from Lisbon to 
Vladivostok’ between the EU and Russia. It was agreed 
upon in principle in the 2003 St Petersburg summit as the 
Common Economic Space. Tangible advances in the 
EAEU’s economic integration are however unlikely to 
come about rapidly. For many reasons, but chiefly with 
regard to its economic feasibility, this scenario is highly 
unlikely. Its economic governance-driven logic could 
however inform negotiations within the second scenario 
as a long-term goal. 
 
Why is the second scenario most probable? Since the 
EAEU plans have concretized, Russia but also other EAEU 
members repeatedly called for interregional dialogue and 
cooperation. All EAEU members are supportive of EU-
EAEU trade talks, but for different reasons. For Russia, the 
dialogue would help conserve vital trade links with the EU. 
Eurasian Development Bank technocrats also favour a 
trade dialogue leading to eventual free trade, but even the 
most optimist voices suggest the mid-2020s as the most 
likely time for the creation of an EU-EAEU FTA (Shirov & 
Yantovsky 2014: 18). Other EAEU members support a 
trade dialogue for the simple reason that they are wary of 
Russian attempts at using the EAEU for its geopolitical 
purposes. Their hope would be for the EU to act as an 
external reinforcing agent of the EAEU’s trade dimension.  
 
Whilst technocratic in nature, EAEU-EU dialogue would be 
strategically grounded in how institutional similarity 
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between the organisations could imply behavioural 
convergence. The EU would seek to incentivize EAEU 
behaviour to match its organizational structure and 
mission borrowed from the EU. The EU’s strategy would 
thus simply seek to enhance the economic dimension of 
the EAEU, at the expense of geopolitics. Concretely, this 
would mean to engage the EAEU as an institution, above 
all its Commission, by insisting on relations between 
supranational administrative bodies only.  
 
ENP countries: caught in between again? 
 
Whilst the EU, Russia and other EAEU members want 
different things out of a potential dialogue, it is crucial also 
to incorporate the interests of ENP countries. It would 
seem that the only progressive strategy to ensure the 
stability and development of these countries is a 
counterintuitive approach. Relativizing Russian geopolitics 
could simply entail the EU’s recognition of Russia as a great 
power. By doing so, the EU might render the ENP countries 
the service of recognizing the need for ambiguous foreign 
policy identities. ENP countries require the EU’s strategy 
to enable peaceful, constructive relations with all of its 
immediate neighbours, including Russia. 
 
The validation of the EAEU through a trade dialogue 
would, by implication, also endorse its geopolitics to a 
certain point, whilst mainly strengthening the EAEU’s 
economic governance dimension. But besides a more 
formal recognition of the geopolitical underpinnings of EU 
foreign policy, arguably little would change on the ground 
for the ENP countries. Double membership in both the 
EAEU and EU is precluded by both sides’ legal status of a 
CU. EAEU member states cannot conclude a DCFTA with 
the EU, and vice versa. The two regions thus can only enter 
free trade relations if all members on both sides are 
involved. In between these core regions, ENP countries are 
part of what Katzenstein (2005: 24) calls “porous regions”: 
contemporary trade blocs are not geopolitical blocs, but 
contribute to overall trade openness also with non-
members. Notably the CIS could enable such ‘porosity’ for 
the benefit of many ENP countries.  
 
The 2015 ENP Review acknowledges this need for porous 
regions by recognizing that “a number of partners do not 
currently wish to pursue” the level of ambition of the EaP 
(European Commission 2015b: 8). The EU also “remains 
committed to encouraging trade between the EU, ENP 
partner countries and their trading partners” (ibid.). Yet, 
these few sentences cannot hide that the ENP currently 
disavows the existence of a Russian regional policy, and of 
the EAEU as a regional integration project. Making EU-
EAEU interregionalism work for ENP countries will need to 
become part of future revisions of the EU’s approach. 
The pitfalls of EU-EAEU cooperation 
 
Any form of EU-EAEU interregionalism runs the risk of a 
classical pitfall of EU foreign policy towards Russia – 
mismatched strategic goals, where the EU’s seemingly 
postmodern ambitions are met with Russian geopolitical 
assertions. Three potential problems of EU-EAEU 
interregionalism should be considered. 
 
First, the establishment of EU-EAEU dialogue could be 
perceived as a concession to Russia. Whilst driving forward 
economic cooperation, clear expectations would need to 
be agreed in the geopolitical realm. Once some form of 
interregional cooperation is established, the threat of 
suspension of this cooperation could yield only limited EU 
leverage. Trade diplomacy would, however, remain 
decidedly toothless if Russia continues to use periodical 
geopolitical-military interventions to force institutional 
changes or enlargement of the EAEU, for example by using 
energy prices as a bargaining chip. 
 
Second, the legal certainty of the EAEU is doubtful. 
National implementation of EAEU acts is still slow. 
Especially Russia’s coercive tactics to incentivise Ukraine 
to join the EAEU demonstrated the fragility of the law-
based order of the EAEU. In the wake of the war in Ukraine, 
Russia introduced unilateral anti-dumping and restrictive 
measures on Ukraine – a clear violation of the EAEU’s legal 
competence. Other EAEU members refused to follow 
Russia’s lead. Further, a ban on food imports from Belarus 
to Russia in late 2014 exemplifies how Russia also 
undermined the Eurasian CU internally. In an ironic twist, 
Russia thus repeatedly undermined its own achievements.  
 
Third, by extending a trade-based approach to the EAEU, 
the EU could be seen as weakening its conditionality and 
democracy promotion in EAEU and ENP countries. 
Validation of the EAEU therefore would imply also the 
consolidation of the EAEU’s undemocratic regimes. The EU 
would possibly attempt to attach political conditionality to 
EU-EAEU trade talks, but the EAEU is unlikely to accept 
such broader conditions. In the ENP/‘near abroad’ 
countries, de-mystifying the EU’s ‘other’ would mean that 
the EU’s normative offer loses some of its traction, and the 
countries’ Europeanisation beyond economic integration 
would presumably slow down.  
 
Blunting conditionality? The EAEU within the EU’s 
general foreign policy and global strategy  
 
EU considerations whether to pursue EU-EAEU 
interregionalism also relate to its other foreign policy 
goals. The development of another rule-based, WTO-
compatible regional organization with its own (nascent) 
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supranational economic governance is no novelty for the 
EU. However, Russia’s trade weight in EU imports creates 
contradictory strategic imperatives for the EU: the EAEU is 
the only operational CU in the world (excluding other CUs 
with exemption rates above 30 per cent that do not fully 
liberalize trade) besides the EU and the EU-Turkey 
Customs Union. By design, Eurasian regionalism hence has 
attained a qualitatively different level and requires 
dialogue and technical exchange to understand the 
developments of the next few years, geopolitics 
notwithstanding. Put bluntly, the EU can hardly ignore 
developments in a market of 180 million people. 
 
The EU’s foreign policy towards Central Asia is also called 
into question by the EAEU. The EU reiterated its strategy 
on Central Asia in June 2015, notably by aiming at 
“strengthening trade and energy links” (Council of the 
European Union 2015). The countries covered by this 
strategy are all EAEU members or immediate neighbours 
with close economic ties, which increases the relevance of 
EU-EAEU interregionalism. In its bilateral contacts with 
EAEU members besides Russia, the EU strictly respects the 
legal competence of the EAEU and hence, theoretically, 
enables a potential EU-EAEU interregionalism for the 
future. 
 
More broadly, the EU is not the EAEU’s only interlocutor. 
With a congealed EU-Russia relationship, Russia and the 
EAEU Commission are looking to other countries and 
regions. The EAEU has already concluded a FTA with Viet 
Nam, and exploratory talks or negotiations are underway 
with Egypt, Iran, Israel and other countries. The EAEU is 
also aiming at establishing trade ties with other regions. At 
the May 2016 Russia-ASEAN Summit, Russia suggested a 
joint feasibility study of a comprehensive free trade area 
between ASEAN and EAEU. While such partnerships will 
take time to be established, the EU’s conditionality and 
sanctions regime towards Russia does not occur in a 
vacuum. With the EAEU turning to other partners, the EU’s 
conditionality increasingly is losing its grip. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Today’s EU rhetoric on Russia should not be confused with 
potential future developments. EU-EAEU interregionalism 
is not an immediate scenario, but a medium-term 
possibility. It is not a magic solution, but both the 
imperative to pacify relations with Russia as well as 
broader EU foreign policy considerations could nudge the 
two sides towards interregionalism. Under the right 
conditions, a rapprochement between the EU and Russia 
will likely come about through trade.  
 
EU-EAEU trade interregionalism would operate in the 
WTO’s regulatory regime and is entirely compatible with 
the EU’s trade approach. The EU should therefore ensure 
that its eventual rapprochement to Russia strengthens its 
policy of ‘effective multilateralism’.  The EU should 
furthermore clarify how it organises its trade governance 
internally. By elevating trade to a high politics issue, the EU 
wrests a hitherto technocratic policy area from its usual 
lead by the European Commission. Potential EU-EAEU 
interregionalism therefore requires a rethinking of both 
the EU’s diplomatic system as well as its strategy. Finally, 
the EU’s own geopolitics should not be forgotten. A de-
escalation through trade without a military de-escalation, 
e.g. by reducing the number of stationed NATO troops in 
Eastern Europe, will run counter to the strategic goal of 
pacifying relations with Russia. 
 
At worst, EU-EAEU interregionalism will feed into Russian 
geopolitical hegemony, validate autocratic governance in 
EAEU countries and undermine the EU’s democratisation 
in ENP countries. At best, the mutual dependence of the 
EAEU and EU markets will override geopolitical 
considerations, and do so even to the benefit of ENP 
countries. Constructive discussions and small steps are 
now needed to build the mutual confidence for 
rapprochement between the two trade blocs. 
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